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PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER† 
ABSTRACT 
   In both his article Property as the Law of Things and his prior 
work, Professor Henry Smith has revitalized property law theory by 
emphasizing the architectural role that property plays in private law 
and the ways in which modular property rights reduce information 
costs and promote both property use and transfer. I applaud Smith’s 
insistence that we focus on the systemic nature of property rights and 
the benefits of bundled entitlements. At the same time, it is important 
to understand the limitations of Smith’s analysis. 
   Property law goes beyond managing the complexity of human 
interaction. Property not only presents a coordination problem but 
also a constitutional problem. Many issues fundamental to property 
law systems require attention to the norms, values, and ways of life 
that a society embraces. The problem is not just how to grease the 
wheels of social interaction; the problem is how to determine the 
character of that interaction. Value choices must be made to 
determine what property rights can be created, how many owners we 
should have, who can become an owner, how long rights last, and 
what obligations owners should have. Because we live in a free and 
democratic society that treats each person with equal concern and 
respect, we must interpret the fundamental values of liberty, equality, 
and democracy to define the set of property rights that we can 
recognize. 
   Property law is not simply about best management practices or 
coordination in the face of scarcity. Democracies elect leaders who 
pass laws that establish minimum standards for social and economic 
relationships compatible with our justified expectations and our 
considered judgments about what it means to treat others with dignity 
and respect. Property law is not just a mechanism of coordination; it 
is a quasi-constitutional framework for social life. Property is not 
merely the law of things. Property is the law of democracy. 
 
Copyright © 2014 Joseph William Singer. 
  †  Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks and affection go to Martha 
Minow, Mira Singer, Greg Alexander, Bethany Berger, Nestor Davidson, and Eduardo 
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   No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States. 
   – U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 8
1 
   We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness. 
   – The Declaration of Independence
2 
INTRODUCTION 
What is property? For most people, property means the things 
we own. Lawyers, however, understand property as legal relations 
among persons with respect to things.
3 Some scholars deem property 
to be a natural right while others view it as a delegation of sovereign 
power or as a package of legal entitlements.
4 Property evokes 
 
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 2.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 3.  RESTATEMENT  (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936) (“The word 
‘property’ is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations between persons with respect to 
a thing.”). 
 4.  Compare JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Richard Hildreth 
trans., Oceana Publ’ns, Inc. 1975) (1802) (“Property and law are born together, and die 
together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.”), 
with Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
1549, 1568 (2003) (stating that property is a natural right), and Morris R. Cohen, Property and 
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 9, 13 (1927) (stating that property is a delegation of sovereign 
power). SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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romantic images, such as “a room of one’s own” or “the American 
Dream” or even (paradoxically) “theft.” Under any rubric or 
conception, property suggests a stable basis of expectation with 
respect to control of valued things. Stability is so important to our 
image of property that four current Supreme Court Justices have 
opined that no “established right of private property” can be altered 
in any way without compensation.
5 At the same time, though it is 
undoubtedly true that justified expectations are crucial to property 
law, it is also true that the actions and property rights of others can 
affect our property and even impair or destroy its value. Others can 
build their own homes and block our view. They can erect 
McMansions that alter the nature of the neighborhood. They can 
default on subprime loans, leaving abandoned homes that may 
depress the market value of our own homes. They can compete with 
us and put us out of business. They can adopt condominium rules that 
limit what we can do in our own apartments. They can lobby for 
changes in zoning laws that downzone the area and prevent us from 
doing what we hoped to do with our own land. Property law may 
protect our justified expectations, but it does not freeze them in place, 
and it is not an easy or automatic process to determine when our 
expectations are justified and when they are not justified. 
In truth, we face hard choices in defining property rights. Where 
one may see an established property right, another may, in good faith, 
see a case that needs to be distinguished, narrowing the scope of the 
property right in question.
6 To figure out who is right when we 
confront such issues, we need to know how to think about property 
and property law. We need the right metaphors, frames of reference, 
modes of analysis, and burdens of proof; we need these things 
because they focus our attention in particular ways, clarifying some 
issues and obscuring others. Let us say we want to think deeply about 
property. Where should we focus our attention? What is most 
important to notice about American property law? 
 
  5.  Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 
(2010) (plurality opinion). 
 6.  See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV.  1369, 1383–84 (2013). In Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, 
Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978), for example, the majority found the case governed by the 
absolute ownership rule with such confidence that it refused to apply the new law it adopted 
retroactively. Id. at 25–27. Conversely, the dissenting judge distinguished the cases applying the 
absolute ownership rule, found the rule wholly inapplicable, and deemed the current case to be 
one of first impression. Id. at 33 (Pope, J., dissenting). SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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Professor Henry Smith has revitalized traditional property law 
scholarship by giving a spirited defense of some aspects of the 
traditional legal doctrines governing estates in land.
7 This 
hypertechnical, abstruse set of rules appears removed from modern 
policy concerns or values and increasingly lacks any understandable 
justification. Nor has it been substantially modernized as were the 
subjects of torts and contracts following the legal-realist revolution in 
legal thought. Though Professor Wesley Hohfeld successfully 
recharacterized property as comprising a bundle of rights rather than 
a unified whole, Hohfeld’s scholarship did not result in significant 
rationalization of the estates system.
8 The estates system persisted 
through the twentieth century despite other vast changes in the law 
and became increasingly difficult to justify. 
Why not abolish the estates system and allow owners to 
disaggregate property rights as they see fit? The existing rules require 
us to figure out what estate the grantor created, not what package of 
property rights she intended to create. If the package of rights defined 
by the grantor does not fit into an established estate, we choose 
whichever estate is closest to what the grantor intended and we 
ignore whatever is incompatible with that estate. When we do this, 
some of what the grantor intended may be discarded and ruled out of 
bounds and unenforceable. Why limit freedom of contract or free 
disposition in this way? Smith has provided a possible answer to this 
question. He argues that information cost economization gives us 
reason to define packages of rights that go along with various forms 
of ownership—rights in rem over things protected against everyone 
else in the world.
9 Arguing mostly in a mode that uses cost-benefit 
analysis, Smith focuses on the structural role that estates play in the 
property system.
10 He goes further and argues that property’s 
architecture plays a crucial role in private law more generally.
11 
 
  7.  Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012). 
 8.  See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). For explanation of the significance of 
Hohfeld’s scholarship, see  Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical 
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1056–59. Hohfeld’s scholarship 
did help to combat Lochnerism by affirming the legitimacy of legislative regulation of property 
rights, on the grounds that limitation of a few rights in the bundle did not necessarily result in a 
deprivation of property without due process of law. See Hohfeld, supra, at 35 (noting that 
privileges and rights can exist even when the other is lacking).  
 9.  Smith,  supra note 7, at 1693–94.  
 10.  Id. at 1694.  
 11.  Id.  SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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Part I explains the major contributions of Smith’s view. I then 
argue that Smith’s focus on property law as a solution to a 
coordination problem fails to address the ways in which property law 
is also a constitutional problem. It may be true that we need to grease 
the wheels of social interaction, but it is also true that we need to 
judge and regulate the character of that interaction. Smith’s argument 
depends on assumptions that he does not make explicit. We must 
explicate these because property law implicates fundamental value 
choices that must be addressed first before analyzing human 
interaction and coordination within a chosen social and political 
order. 
Part II gives specific examples of the ways in which property law 
shapes social life and both reflects and promotes fundamental values. 
We see underlying value choices in determining what property rights 
can be created, how many owners we should have, who can become 
an owner, how long rights last, and what obligations owners should 
have. 
Part III widens the lens to explain the reasons we need to 
consider the teachings of moral, political, and legal theory in addition 
to economics to sensibly analyze and interpret the basic values of a 
free and democratic society that treats each person with equal 
concern and respect. Liberty, equality, and democracy are not self-
defining. They are essentially contested concepts and there is much 
disagreement about what they mean. At the same time, there are also 
large areas of overlapping consensus about what these values require. 
Smith is right that the nature of the things we control through 
property law should lead us to adopt certain appropriate strategies for 
managing and coordinating our access to and our control of them. 
Coordination, however, is only a problem because we live in a liberal 
democracy comprised of free and equal persons. Understanding 
coordination therefore requires an understanding of both freedom 
and equality. Property is more than the law of things; property is the 
law of democracy. Property law shapes social relations, and because 
we live in a free and democratic society that aspires to treat each 
person with equal concern and respect, a crucial function of property 
law is to interpret what that means. 
I.  PROPERTY LAW AS BUNDLED RIGHTS IN THINGS 
Professor Henry Smith has performed an invaluable service to 
property law theory by conceptualizing property not simply as an SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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individual right or bundle of rights but as a framework for 
“interactions of persons in society” as well as the foundation and 
infrastructure of private law.
12 Smith asks us to think about property 
as the “law of things.”
13 This evocative metaphor not only harkens 
back to William Blackstone’s grand distinction between the “rights of 
persons” and the “rights of things”
14 but also subtly dissents from the 
legal realist conception of property as a bundle of rights with respect 
to things.
15 Smith agrees with the legal realists that property 
ownership does comprise a bundle of rights, that those rights are not 
absolute, and that some of them can be individually alienated.
16 He 
emphasizes, however, that the package of rights is not infinitely 
malleable. Rather, some bundles of rights must stick together for the 
property system to work properly.
17 Rather than bundles of rights that 
can be disaggregated at will, Smith argues for what I will call bundled 
rights. Some packages of rights are crucial to the functioning of the 
property system and the rest of private law as well. For this reason, 
the law structures property rights into modules and places limits on 
the power of owners to disaggregate the rights that are packaged in 
these modules.
18 Some bundles of rights support the property system 
itself and cannot be dismantled without undermining the foundations 
of the house. There is, Smith argues, a systemic logic to property and 
 
 12.  Id. at 1691. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  1  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121 (titling Book the First “Of the Rights 
of Persons”); 2 id. *1 (titling Book the Second “Of the Rights of Things”). 
  15. Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936) (“The word 
‘property’ is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations between persons with respect to 
a thing.”); id. (“Legal relations between persons can be of widely differing types. Clarity of 
thought and exactness of expression require the analysis and subdivision of legal relations into 
types having different signifances. This analysis is made in §§ 1–4 defining respectively those 
legal relations designated by the words ‘right,’ ‘privilege,’ ‘power’ and ‘immunity.’”); Hohfeld, 
supra note 8, at 30–32 (explaining the analytical differences among rights, privileges, powers, 
and immunities). 
 16.  See  Smith,  supra note 7, at 1696, 1699, 1710 (incorporating these concepts into his 
argument).  
 17.  See id. at 1693 (“Property organizes this world into lumpy packages of legal relations—
legal things—by setting boundaries around useful attributes that tend to be strong 
complements.”); see also Joseph William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a 
Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1021 & n.44, 1022 (2009) (making this 
point and arguing that Smith’s scholarship helps to emphasize and justify it). 
 18.  See Smith, supra note 7, at 1693–94 (arguing that the property system depends on its 
modular structure). SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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property law that not only explains much of existing law but also gives 
us a normative framework for judging it.
19 
These insights have played an extremely helpful role in current 
property theory. In recent years, the estates system has been going 
out of fashion and taking up less time in many property law courses.
20 
Property professors pay more attention these days than in the past to 
trespass, covenants, easements, leases, zoning, and real-estate 
transactions, not to mention intellectual property and regulatory 
takings. In law practice, future interests are not the focus of housing 
or of commercial real-estate transactions, though they remain 
important for trusts and estates law. To the current generation, the 
law of estates in land seems technical, bizarre, and antiquated. This is 
partly because of its arcane terminology and partly because many 
traditional rules have archaic justifications. 
More importantly, the idea that there are only a few bundles of 
rights one can create also contradicts the modern preference for 
freedom of contract, evident in the myriad covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions we see in property owners’ associations. Libertarians can 
hardly be overjoyed about legal rules that force property transactions 
into a few, preset bundles, rather than allow owners to disaggregate 
property as they like.
21 Progressives cannot be too attracted to rules 
 
 19.  See id. at 1691–94. 
 20.  Cf. D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests,  66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 17–20 (2009) (proposing a way to fix the unnecessary complexity of the 
estates system); T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 513, 
514–15 (2003) (arguing for reform of the estates system to reduce its complexity); Louise A. 
Halper, Q. Why is this Course Different from All Other Courses? A. Maybe It’s Not, 22 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 965, 970 (1999) (reviewing JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW 
AND  POLICY:  A  COMPARATIVE  INSTITUTIONAL  PERSPECTIVE  (1998)) (noting the smaller 
number of estates-related cases in a leading casebook). 
  21.  I use the terms “libertarian,” “conservative,” “liberal,” and “progressive” in their 
modern senses as used in contemporary political rhetoric. Broadly speaking, libertarians are 
attracted to what they view as a “limited state” that protects individuals from harm, enforces 
contracts, and protects property rights. They favor freedom of contract because they see it as a 
core aspect of liberty; for that reason, they are likely to view with great suspicion any regulatory 
rules that limit the packages of property rights that can be created because those packages 
interfere with freedom of contract. Conservatives often adopt a libertarian stance toward 
economic regulation (thus agreeing with libertarian views on freedom of contract), but they 
tend to couple that commitment with support for regulations designed to promote “traditional 
values” in the areas of sexuality and family life. Liberals or progressives tend to favor regulation 
of market relations for a variety of reasons, such as fairness, distributional norms, and the 
promotion of minimum standards for market relationships. Just as conservatives may flip their 
deregulatory stance when dealing with matters of sex and family, liberals and progressives tend 
to adopt a libertarian approach to such matters rather than the regulatory one they adopt with 
respect to economic matters. SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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that consolidate powers in owners while leaving nonowners without 
access to the things they need. And efficiency theorists tend to talk 
about property rights as if they were merely transaction costs—
impediments to the transfer of resources to those who value them 
most highly.
22 Against this united front, Smith shows us how things 
would be much worse for us if we did not have a system of bundled 
rights.
23 He has presented a coherent picture of some reasons why 
bundled rights matter and has convincingly demonstrated that 
property law is part of the infrastructure of private law and a 
foundation for social life. 
To explain why property law plays this pivotal role, Smith argues 
that property presents us with a complex coordination problem. We 
need to “manage[] the complexity of human interactions.”
24 Because 
property concerns scarce resources and because people want to use 
resources for their various purposes, we need a way to allocate 
powers over those resources, especially use rights. When resources 
are scarce, creating rules about property use is beneficial; however, 
such rules are also costly to create, define, and enforce. Smith argues 
that the focus of property law is to minimize the costs of information 
we need to figure out who gets to do what with what thing.
25 We do 
this by granting specific things to owners, with a package of powers 
“in rem” giving them general rights to control a thing against the 
entire world.
26 If we do this, we can minimize information costs by 
allocating gatekeeping powers over particular things.
27 Those powers 
are protected by a general right to exclude others from particular 
objects of property. This “exclusion strategy” not only grants owners 
capacious powers to control things but also implies an architecture for 
the entire property system.
28 We divide the world into things and then 
allocate those things among owners, giving them the power to exclude 
 
 22.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 380 (2001) (explaining how efficiency theorists tend to view 
property as a bundle of rights that can be recombined or disaggregated at will to promote 
human interests and arguing that such theorists do not sufficiently understand the ways that 
limits on disaggregation of property rights might promote efficiency rather than simply impede 
it). 
 23.  See Smith, supra note 7, at 1720–22 (discussing the implications and advantages of his 
approach).  
 24.  Id. at 1725. 
 25.  Id. at 1691, 1698, 1700–13. 
 26.  Id. at 1702–08.  
 27.  Id. at 1709–13.  
 28.  Id. at 1709–16.  SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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others from things they own as well as general powers to use them 
and transfer them. Then we establish public recording offices to make 
it possible for anyone to find out who is the owner of each thing. 
All this minimizes the costs of figuring out whom to talk to if you 
want access to a thing you do not own, and it frees all of us from 
having to explain to others our own decisions about how to use our 
own things. Sometimes we disengage from this exclusion strategy and 
ask the courts to engage in nuanced, contextual determinations of the 
distribution and scope of particular property rights, but Smith argues 
that we adopt this “governance strategy” only if the benefits of doing 
so outweigh the costs.
29 He emphasizes that we can generally 
minimize costs by eschewing such contextual analyses.
30 Governance 
strategies are the exception, not the rule.
31 Rather than treating each 
case as a particular contextual problem about who gets to control the 
property, Smith argues that we should see the structural reasons for 
formal generalizations as well as preset packages of rights through 
assignment of ownership and general rights to exclude, all of which 
enable people to interact with others at manageable cost.
32 
We all have reason to celebrate this new turn in property theory. 
Smith has reminded libertarians that they not only favor freedom of 
contract, but they also favor the rights of owners and their freedom 
from undue limitations on their ability to choose how to use their own 
property. It is easy to see how the freedom to disaggregate property 
rights at will may wind up impinging on property rights and freedoms 
that libertarians may cherish. Consider how limited our freedom 
would be if we had to comply with limitations imposed by those who 
owned our property in the 1640s.
33 Consider the constraints we would 
face if much of the land in the United States was inalienable because 
it was “entailed” and destined to stay within a particular family.
34 
Consider the federal statute that restored the rights of condominium 
owners to fly the American flag from their balconies despite any 
 
 29.  Id. at 1693–94, 1703–05. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. at 1693–94.  
 33.  See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 7.1, at 300 (3d ed. 2010) (describing how 
“land use was far from free because it was always intimately connected with services owed to a 
higher lord, all the way up to the monarch”).  
 34.  Id. § 7.7.1, at 323–25. SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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condominium association rules to the contrary.
35 Libertarians who 
favor freedom of contract may have opposed that law, but others who 
value the freedom of owners to use their property as they see fit may 
have applauded it. 
Progressives can also celebrate the notion that owners have 
freedoms that cannot be taken away by private contract or will. 
Consider the Fair Housing Act,
36 which guarantees access to housing 
without regard to race or religion,
37 or the implied warranty of 
habitability that guarantees tenants livable housing.
38 Smith has also 
reminded efficiency aficionados that markets cannot work without 
the bundled property rights that form the basis for market 
transactions and that minimize the costs of determining who gets to 
control the things in the world. Property rights are not merely 
impediments to resources ending up in the hands of those who value 
them the most; they are one of the basic tools that allow markets to 
exist in the first place. They are inherently valuable because they 
enable people to act, to invest, to plan, and to exchange goods and 
services. They establish bargaining power that protects individuals 
from being forced to comply with the will of others; they are a 
significant part of what makes free markets “free.” 
Smith teaches property law scholars several crucial lessons.
39 
First, he emphasizes that property is a system and not just an 
individual entitlement. The recognition and exercise of property 
rights inevitably affect others. Property rights and externalities are 
born together; you cannot have one without the other.
40 The 
assignment of ownership to one person necessarily affects others by 
giving the owner the power to exclude others from the resource even 
 
  35.  Freedom To Display the American Flag Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-243, § 3, 120 Stat. 
572, 572–73 (2006) (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 5 note (2012)). 
  36.  Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
 37.  Id. § 3604.  
 38.  See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“In our 
judgment the common law itself must recognize the landlord’s obligation to keep his premises in 
a habitable condition.”).  
  39.  In addition to Smith’s article Property as the Law of Things, supra note 7, see generally, 
for example, Merrill & Smith, supra note 22; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in 
the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: 
Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002); Henry E. Smith, 
On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012); Henry E. Smith, 
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004). 
  40.  Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership, 
in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 57, 59 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 
2010).  SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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if they need it. Externalities only come into play if we have property 
rights because, in a state of nature unencumbered by law, everyone 
acts to further their own interests. There is no basis for saying that 
something wrongly impinges on others if we do not have a sense of 
what we have a right to be protected from. Given that law identifies 
the interests that deserve legal protection, we can only determine 
whether an action causes an externality by reference to a normative 
framework that distinguishes self-regarding from other-regarding 
actions. 
Because property rights necessarily affect others, they must be 
regulated to ensure that they are compatible with the property and 
personal rights of others. The scope of a property right depends on 
the effects on others with whom we are willing to live. An owner’s 
interest in controlling a thing cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
interests of others. Property rights must be tailored to ensure that 
they are mutually compatible with each other, and the distribution 
and packaging of property rights must be structured so that they work 
over time, given the realities of human life. Creating an architecture 
for property law must take into account the systemic effects of various 
bundles of rights as they are exercised over time. That requires 
limiting the ability of owners to unbundle property rights when doing 
so undermines the smooth functioning of the system itself. 
Second, Smith asks us to focus on the basic structure of the 
property system. In so doing, he reminds us that property rights must 
be defined prior to markets; they are a foundation upon which 
markets rest. We cannot act unless we are free to act in some place; 
no property rights, no markets. We cannot buy something if we do 
not have entitlements to exchange with others; no property rights, no 
contracts. And we cannot make choices about what to do without 
having capacious powers over discrete objects in the world; no 
property rights, no freedom. Property rights precede actions, 
contracts, and markets. In important ways, property precedes both 
liberty and efficiency. 
Property precedes liberty because we cannot decide how to live 
if we are not given general powers to choose how to use the things we 
own. If we have to ask permission for each thing we want to do, or if 
we have to consult a list to make sure we are not engaging in a 
prohibited action, we will be inhibited from living our lives on our 
own terms. Property precedes efficiency because we cannot use 
market values to define property rights since market values are 
dependent on an initial distribution of property that is then SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
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exchanged within those markets. Determining what individuals are 
willing and able to pay for an entitlement requires positing a 
distribution of property before the efficiency analysis even begins. 
This does not mean that efficiency analysis cannot help us think about 
the appropriate distribution of property; Smith and Professor Thomas 
Merrill have explained why property matters to economic analysis.
41 
But it does mean that the kind of analysis we use to choose the basic 
structure of property law may be different from the kind of analysis 
we use to determine the scope of rights within the system. 
Third, Smith reminds us that there are good reasons why the law 
places distinct limits on our freedom to disaggregate property rights.
42 
There are some bundles of rights we are not, and should not, be 
allowed to create. Property comes in discrete modules that enable us 
to know what we own and what we can do with it. Those modules not 
only give us valuable information; they free us from unwarranted 
restrictions. They enable us to deal with others on terms we can 
understand. They protect our justified expectations by enabling us to 
know what rights we get when we buy something. They free us from 
having to bargain about every basic thing we expect to get when we 
engage in a transaction. They allow us to take certain things for 
granted.
43 For example, we have abolished the fee tail and most 
restraints on alienation of fee simple interests to ensure both free use 
of land and transferability.
44 We have passed consumer protection 
laws in every state to ensure that we get what we pay for.
45 We have 
building-construction codes, housing codes, and zoning laws to ensure 
that our property is safe and protected from incompatible uses.
46 The 
set of bundled rights we are entitled to create must be limited by law 
to promote both freedom and efficiency. 
In sum, Smith argues that the systemic,  foundational, and 
modular nature of property implies that it can function only within 
 
  41.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 398.  
 42.  See generally Smith, supra note 7 (arguing that a modular theory of property, in which 
certain rights are grouped together, provides a better explanation of property law than a theory 
of detachable sticks).  
  43.  Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 157–58 (2012). 
 44.  SINGER, supra note 33, § 7.7.1, at 323–25.  
 45.  See generally CAROLYN  L.  CARTER,  NAT’L  CONSUMER  LAW  CTR.,  CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND 
PRACTICES  STATUTES  (2009),  available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-
udap-50-states.pdf. 
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the framework of a workable architecture. Property law provides that 
architecture.
47 I wholeheartedly support these insights, and Smith’s 
care in formulating and explaining them marks an invaluable 
contribution to our understanding of both property as a social 
institution and of property law. At the same time, there are 
limitations to the way Smith analyzes the architecture of property law. 
He focuses on property as a coordination problem or as problem of 
minimizing the costs of managing the complexity of human 
interaction.
48 Though these issues are both important and 
fundamental to the property system, they take our attention away 
from values and value choices that are not only basic elements of 
property law but are also fundamental to both private and public law 
more generally. 
Smith is quite right that property poses a coordination problem, 
but property also poses a constitutional problem. By constitutional I 
do not mean to refer only to constitutional law, but to the fact that 
property institutions are fundamental to social life, moral norms, 
political power, and the rule of law.
49 Property institutions not only 
regulate the complexity of human interaction, but also shape the 
character of those interactions. Property is not only about the 
allocation of scarce resources, the management of complex 
information, or the coordination of land use among competing users; 
it is about our way of life. If this is true, then property law should 
reflect and shape our deepest values. Property is not just about 
information or complexity; it is about promoting “Life, Liberty and 
the Pursuit of Happiness.”
50 Information costs help us manage in the 
world, but they are neither the only thing we care about nor the most 
important. Property is about the social order; it reflects and enables 
our conception of what it means to live in a free and democratic 
society that treats each person with equal concern and respect.
51 
Smith argues that there is a structural logic to property law that 
is helpful no matter what purposes we have or what values we 
 
 47.  See  Smith,  supra note 7, at 1700 (arguing that “[t]here is a basic architecture of 
property, and many features of property follow from it”).  
 48.  See id. at 1699 (arguing that the “architecture [of property] responds . . . to the problem 
of managing the complexity of interactions between private parties with respect to a variety of 
attributes of resources in a world of positive delineation costs”).  
 49.  See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 1–2 (1997). 
 50.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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cherish. He hopes to eschew reliance on any particular moral or 
political theory such as utilitarianism.
52 His normative goal is to 
analyze what makes property systems work well at minimum cost, 
given the realities of human life.
53 He wants to focus on the structures 
of property that are necessary to enable any legitimate values to be 
promoted.
54 Yet despite these ambitions, Smith does not eschew value 
choices. Indeed, he makes a number of legitimate but unstated 
normative assumptions about the values that a property system 
should promote. He assumes (1) that every person is entitled to 
become an owner, (2) that opportunities to acquire property are 
freely available, (3) that ownership is widely dispersed, (4) that 
owners are presumptively free to use their property as they wish and 
to determine the course of their own lives, and (5) that people are 
entitled to quiet enjoyment of their property. These are widely shared 
norms that reflect widely shared values. The property system whose 
structure Smith analyzes embodies the values of liberty, equality, and 
stability, among others. But these norms are not self-defining even if 
the Declaration of Independence would have us view them as self-
evident. These values require interpretation. Failure to address the 
meaning of these values directly prevents us from seeing the 
foundational choices needed to create a property law system 
compatible with these values. 
Smith’s focus on the costs and benefits of alternative strategies 
for organizing property rights inevitably utilizes economic theory 
more intensively than other potentially relevant frames of reference 
or methods of analysis. But we can neither understand our property 
law system nor adequately judge it unless we supplement economic 
analysis with the disciplines of moral theory, political philosophy, 
history, and legal theory.
55 Property law in contemporary America is 
 
 52.  See Smith, supra note 7, at 1719 (suggesting that property law promotes a variety of 
values, including “efficiency, fairness, justice, and virtue”). 
 53.  See id. at 1691–94.  
 54.  Cf.  id. at 1725 (mentioning a number of potential “goals” of property law, such as 
“autonomy, privacy, investment, planning, and appropriability according to criteria of 
efficiency, fairness, and morality”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Singer, supra note 43, at 144; Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the 
Infrastructure of Democracy, Lecture at the University of Florida Levin College of Law (2011), 
in 11 POWELL ON REAL  PROPERTY WFL11-1, WFL11-3 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2013) 
[hereinafter Singer, Infrastructure of Democracy]; Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid 
Principle in American Property Law, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 91, 109 (2011) [hereinafter 
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not only about the allocation of scarce resources, but also about the 
legal framework of a free and democratic society that treats each 
person with equal concern and respect. Property is not just a choice 
between exclusion and governance strategies; it is a choice between 
feudalism and democracy, between slavery and freedom, between 
bureaucratic expertise and electoral politics, between stability and 
change, between a libertarian conception of freedom and a liberal 
one, between the norms of formal equality and the norm of equal 
opportunity. Property affects polity. Property may be the law of 
things, but property is also the law of democracy. 
Smith argues that property forms the baseline for private law.
56 I 
agree. He also argues that we should consider the best structure for 
property law before looking into the values that property should 
promote.
57 He suggests that we want a system that allows us to best 
achieve our values at the lowest cost, no matter what those values 
happen to be. But the norms associated with a free and democratic 
society imply structural constraints of their own. They are not things 
we can add on later; they inform the basic structure of property rights. 
Smith does not ignore such values; he simply assumes them. But 
anyone who pays attention to contemporary American politics will 
immediately recognize that we have fundamental value conflicts 
about the meaning of liberty, equality, and democracy. Depending on 
our conception of those concepts, we will define the basic structure of 
property law very differently. 
Smith is right that property has an architecture that forms a 
foundation for social life, but property also has a constitution—a set 
of norms and values that defines the legitimate social relationships 
that can be recognized in a free and democratic society that treats 
each person with equal concern and respect. We could manage the 
complexity of human interaction by creating a dictatorship and giving 
all property to a supreme leader. We could abolish all regulatory 
laws, allowing owners to do whatever they like with their property. 
We could allow people to choose to become slaves if they wish. We 
could delegate power to an established church to divvy up property in 
light of religious doctrine. We could disable women from owning 
 
56 UCLA L.  REV.  899, 906 (2009) [hereinafter Singer, Normative Methods] (arguing that 
lawyers should apply principles from “moral and political theory”).  
 56.  See Smith, supra note 7, at 1703 (“[M]odules . . . permit private law to manage highly 
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property. We could segregate housing by race. We could abolish 
corporations. We could allow condominium associations to regulate 
the intimate details of life for their inhabitants, or we could free unit 
owners from oppressive restrictions. We could protect homeowners 
from being deceived by subprime mortgage sales tactics, or we could 
live with laissez faire. We could allow landlords to use self-help to 
evict tenants at will by putting their belongings on the street at a 
moment’s notice, or we could require court evictions to end tenancies. 
We could give landlords the power to regulate tenants’ personal lives, 
or we could prohibit that. All these possibilities would have effects on 
information costs and the complexity of human relationships. But 
they would also fundamentally affect our way of life. 
The values of a free and democratic society are both more 
fundamental and more contested than the value of minimizing 
information costs or the value of managing complex human 
interactions. The question is not just how to simplify human 
interactions; the question is how to define the minimum standards for 
human interactions compatible with the values of a free and 
democratic society that treats each person with equal concern and 
respect. Information costs are important to the structure of property 
law, but political, moral, and rule of law norms must be satisfied first. 
Costs of human interaction become relevant only within a normative 
framework that defines what kinds of property arrangements are 
compatible with the ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy. 
Importantly, not all costs can be quantified, and many important 
features of property law cannot be explained by reference to 
monetary costs. Both the architecture of the property system and also 
the technical details of some property law doctrines depend on norms 
of morality and justice that embody our deepest values. Rather than a 
quantitative problem of how to minimize costs or a structural problem 
of how to manage complexity, we face an interpretive problem of how 
to define the values that shape the legal infrastructure of a free and 
democratic society. That means we also confront a normative problem 
of how to define the contours of social relationships that treat each 
person with equal concern and respect and that are compatible with 
the values of a free and democratic society. 
Smith does not ignore the values of freedom, equality, and 
democracy. Indeed, his cost-minimization program is designed to SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
2014]  PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1303 
promote all those values.
58 My argument is that property theorists 
need to pay as much attention to the contested concepts of liberty, 
equality, and democracy as they do to efficiency and to costs and 
benefits. Smith is absolutely correct that property law is about the 
architecture of private law and the management of complex human 
interactions, but it is also about the infrastructure of a free and 
democratic society, and that requires analysis and interpretation of 
fundamentally contested normative concepts. Smith’s insights depend 
on a normative framework that is implicit in his analysis; the 
normative framework merits separate attention because we cannot 
engage in meaningful analysis of information costs (or any other 
costs) without first discussing the social and legal framework within 
which those costs are computed. Cost-minimization analysis will come 
out very differently if the framework is a libertarian one or a liberal 
one; it will similarly be different depending on whether utilitarianism, 
rights, fairness and justice, or virtue theory are the animating 
normative impulses. If we widen the lens to include the insights of 
political and moral theory, as well as the traditions of the common 
law and the norms associated with the rule of law, we will see the 
constitutional questions lurking behind the coordination dilemmas 
upon which Smith focuses his attention. We will see why property is 
the law of democracy. 
II.  PROPERTY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 
Professor Henry Smith wisely proposes that we consider the 
deep structure of property law. That means going back to first 
principles. If we take this advice seriously, then it becomes evident 
that property law is a constitutional problem because the norms and 
values of a free and democratic society limit the kinds of property 
rights that can be created. Not only do democracies limit the kinds of 
property rights that can be recognized, but they also have something 
to say about how many people can be owners, who can become an 
owner, how long their rights last, and what obligations go along with 
their rights. 
A.  What Kinds of Property Rights Can a Democracy Recognize? 
Property law does more than manage the complexity of human 
interactions to ensure low-cost coordination among people with 
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regard to control of things. Property law establishes a baseline for 
social relations compatible with democracy, both as a political system 
and a form of social life. Property law not only simplifies and 
promotes human interaction, but it also entails substantive choices 
about the type and scope of property rights that a free and democratic 
society can recognize without violating its deepest values. We have, 
for example, abolished feudalism, slavery, primogeniture, male 
control of marital property, racial segregation, the fee tail, and 
debtors’ prisons.
59 We have abolished self-help in landlord-tenant 
relations; we prohibit landlords from putting the tenant’s belongings 
on the street if a rent check is a day late. We require landlords to 
provide habitable housing. We have abolished strict foreclosure of 
mortgages. We have abolished racially restrictive covenants. We have 
enacted zoning and environmental laws and we have protected 
consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices.
60 The host of 
regulations we see both in state and federal law establishes minimum 
standards for social relationships compatible with our choice to live in 
a democracy and to promote freedom and equality. Basic democratic 
values limit the kinds of property rights that the law will recognize, 
and they define particular bundles of rights that cannot be created. 
The modules that define the basic components of the property system 
must satisfy these fundamental norms first before we can shape them 
to manage the complex human interactions that remain. 
Consider slavery. It arguably lowers the cost of human 
interaction by diminishing the number of people who are entitled to 
make choices. With fewer people to deal with, the costs of 
interactions go down. Owners need not obtain information from 
slaves about their preferences because their preferences do not count. 
Slaves themselves have few choices to make; they do what they are 
told. We could drastically reduce the number of property owners by 
enslaving three-quarters of the population. Of course, this places 
management costs on the slaveowners, but those costs are offset by 
the fact that the owners do not have to negotiate with their slaves 
over the terms of employment; they can simply order them around. If 
the slaves resist, they can control them by force. Perhaps human 
desires are less satisfied in the aggregate in such a system because a 
majority of people are stifled in their ability to live their lives on their 
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own terms. And perhaps law enforcement costs go up if the slaves are 
restless and resist orders. But the complexity of human interactions 
has arguably been reduced (at least as a matter of defining the legal 
rights that people have), and coordination problems have been solved 
by giving dictatorial power to slaveowners and reducing the number 
of people who have free will. 
Of course, one can argue that the cost and difficulty of managing 
slaves may outweigh the benefits in reduced information costs, and 
one could construct an argument that demonstrates that slavery is 
more costly than freedom in terms of coordination among persons or 
in reducing the information needed for social interaction. My point 
here is not to argue which of these interpretations is correct. My point 
is that talking about slavery in terms of information costs is wholly 
beside the point. To say that slavery is or is not an option because one 
choice or the other minimizes information costs is to give an irrelevant 
reason for the choice being made. We abolished slavery not because it 
economized on information or because it made human interaction too 
complex. We abolished it because it denies individuals the freedom 
and equal dignity they deserve. We do not choose between slavery 
and freedom on the grounds of complexity or efficiency or 
information costs. We choose between them on the basis of 
fundamental values about the inalienable right of each individual to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We minimize costs of social 
interaction after we have made the decision to abolish slavery and to 
promote equal human dignity, not before. Slavery is not a property 
right that a democracy can legitimately recognize. 
Slavery is sometimes thought to be an extreme example that has 
no relevance to contemporary life. But consider what has occurred 
within my own lifetime. The states that still recognized male 
privileges in tenancies by the entirety abolished them.
61 The separate 
property states adopted equitable distribution statutes that treat 
women as equal partners with men in marriage.
62 We abolished racial 
segregation and disability discrimination, protected women from 
sexual harassment in the workplace, and allowed gay and lesbian 
parents to adopt children.
63 
 
 61.  SINGER, supra note 33, § 8.2.3, at 356–57.  
 62.  Id. § 9.3.1, at 394–96. 
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For contemporary examples, consider same-sex marriage and 
subprime mortgages. Same-sex marriage concerns the rights of 
individuals to participate in a particular property arrangement. In 
many states, the question is not just what to call the arrangement 
(marriage, civil union, or contract) but whether the same-sex couple 
can take on the rights and obligations associated with marriage at all. 
As for subprime mortgages, we are engaged in a continuing debate 
about whether or not they should be prohibited or regulated. We are 
debating whether to forgive principal payments on underwater 
mortgages so we can get the economy moving again. Should we “let 
the market take care of it,” or should laws be changed to prevent 
subprime mortgages from ruining families and national economies in 
the future? Should we apply or amend consumer protection laws to 
prohibit granting mortgages to people who are not likely to be able to 
pay them back? Should we rewrite mortgage contracts to reflect 
current market values? Should we adopt new banking and mortgage 
regulations to prevent this problem from recurring? Should 
mortgages be dischargeable in bankruptcy?
64 These issues implicate 
not only efficiency concerns, but also questions about what kinds of 
contracts are so unfair or deceptive that they are the moral equivalent 
of picking the consumer’s pocket, as well as questions about what 
protections should be in place to enable people who are down on 
their luck to recover and go on with their lives. These are not just 
issues of imperfect information; they are normative questions about 
what conduct promotes (and infringes on) human dignity. 
Smith wrongly assumes that those of us who focus on the values 
promoted by property law cannot see any value in a modular 
approach to property. He suggests that we want every case to be 
treated as if our goal were to enact our most fundamental values and 
that we see no advantage in creating baselines, presumptions, and 
bundled rights.
65 Yet none of the modern proponents of a values-
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based approach to property law has actually argued against the idea 
that property law forms part of the structure of society; nor has 
anyone argued that we can live with a property system that has no 
doctrine, no rules, no modules, no presumptions, and that we can 
replace all that with direct consideration of values like virtue and 
equality in every case.
66 There are moral theorists who are 
particularists who eschew all generalizations.
67 Yet few legal realists 
pursued that path; Hohfeld and legal realists like Karl Llewellyn 
argued for the exercise of judgment in the interpretation of doctrine, 
but not its abolition.
68 And Professor Thomas Grey argued against an 
inherent objective, value-free logic to property rights, but he did not 
argue that there were no reasons to be in favor of particular bundles 
of rights.
69 
I do not know anyone who thinks that we would be better off if 
we had no legal doctrine at all and just treated each property case as 
one of first impression. I also do not know anyone who thinks that it 
is not important to develop property rights that are workable, 
transparent, and suited to the satisfaction of legitimate human 
preferences, desires, and values. Nor have progressive property 
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theorists like myself argued that we should not use our values to 
structure property in ways that allocate presumptive control rights 
and presumptive packages of entitlements. What we have argued is 
that the structure, shape, and definition of the bundled rights in the 
property law system must reflect our considered judgments about the 
legitimate contours of the social order.
70 We have also argued that 
presumptive property rights cannot tell us what to do in hard cases; 
when a plausible argument can be made that a property right should 
be limited or narrowed to protect competing values, we have no 
alternative but to give reasons why the case should or should not be 
distinguished.
71 All this requires interpretive strategies that use 
methods of analysis that go beyond the calculation of the best way to 
lower the cost of coordination among independent actors. In the first 
instance, it requires placing some types of property arrangements off 
the table. Some modules cannot be recognized by the law of a free 
and democratic society no matter how well they reduce the 
complexity of human interaction. 
B.  How Many Owners are Consistent with Democracy? 
The Hawaiian island of Lanai is inhabited by only 3,135 people 
on 141 square miles.
72 Ninety-eight percent of the land is owned by 
one man, Larry Ellison, the cofounder of Oracle Corporation.
73 
Originally owned by Native Hawaiians, by the 1870s most of the land 
had passed to a rancher named Walter Gibson.
74 In 1922, James Dole, 
president of what became the Dole Food Company, bought the island 
and turned it into a huge pineapple plantation.
75 In the 1980s Dole 
moved its operations overseas and converted the land use from 
agriculture to tourism.
76 In 1985, the island’s ownership passed to 
Dole’s parent company, controlled by billionaire David Murdock.
77 
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Murdock sold the island to Ellison in 2012, retaining the right to 
construct a field of forty-five-story wind turbines over a quarter of the 
island.
78 Because the tourist economy is limited by the difficulties of 
getting to the island, as well as harmed by the recent economic 
downturn following the subprime crisis, this development could form 
the backbone of a more robust local economy, or it could ruin the 
island’s wild beauty—or both.
79 The plan has sharply divided residents 
who are also anxious to know how the new development will affect 
their island.
80 
Why tell this story? First, the most striking thing to an American 
is the incongruous fact that all the land on the island is owned by one 
person. The American conception of democracy makes us wince at 
this. It is reminiscent of the feudal system under William the 
Conqueror, who reserved the right to take back the land from his 
lords if they did not do as he wished.
81 When the Illinois Supreme 
Court considered the fact that Pullman’s Palace–Car Company was 
the sole owner of the entire town of Pullman, Illinois, it interpreted 
state law to force the company to sell much of the land.
82 The court 
explained that limiting ownership to one company is “incompatible 
with the theory and spirit of our institutions.”
83 Recall that in colonial 
times, King Charles II gave New Jersey to two lords who sought to 
install a feudal regime only to face stalwart resistance from the 
settlers who insisted on freedom from control by a feudal lord.
84 Their 
resistance led to the modern American system of wide dispersal of 
property ownership rather than allowing it to be concentrated in the 
hands of a small aristocracy.
85 They also helped establish our tradition 
of “freehold” property that confers wide powers on owners to control 
their own land and their own lives rather than being subject to the 
whim of an absentee lord.
86 
Is there or is there not something untoward or wrong about 
having one owner of the entire island of Lanai? The idea of 
minimizing information costs of human interaction does not help us 
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 79.  Id. 
  80. Id. 
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  82.  People v. Pullman’s Palace–Car Co., 51 N.E. 664, 668, 677–78 (Ill. 1898). 
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answer this question. In one sense, we can argue that reducing 
ownership to one minimizes information costs enormously. If you 
want to use any of the land on Lanai, you have to ask Ellison. The 
problems of human coordination have been solved; he decides 
whether you can live on the island, where you can live, and what you 
can do there. On the other hand, although ownership by one person 
gives  him a great deal of certainty, it creates a great deal of 
uncertainty to the nonowners who are subject to the owner’s whim. 
Whether they can or cannot do what they want depends on what 
Ellison decides. Whether they can even live on the island depends on 
what he thinks of them. If our goal is to minimize the costs of 
information for each individual, we need to give each person some 
basis for making plans; that suggests ensuring that each person has 
some property she is entitled to use as she pleases. How many land 
owners do there need to be for this to be true? What rights do tenants 
and nonowners need to have so that they have some opportunity to 
become owners or so that they have sufficient freedom to make their 
own choices about how to live? If each person is entitled to equal 
protection of the law, and if that means that we need to promote 
equal opportunity, what property law architecture is necessary to 
achieve that set of values? How many owners is enough? What is the 
appropriate balance of rights held in fee simple versus leasehold 
versus condominium status? Would it promote or violate property 
rights to take the land from Ellison and redistribute it to the 
thousands of islanders? 
Americans do not all agree about the number of owners or the 
mix of property forms that comports with our commitment to treating 
each person as entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
Nor do we all agree about the contours of the property system that 
shape our choices. We have abolished feudalism, but we still have 
islands owned by one person, and the fact that Americans deeply 
value the ideal of dispersed property ownership does not mean that 
inequality is not an issue for us today. On the contrary, the Occupy 
movement placed on the national agenda the increasing inequality of 
wealth and income over the last thirty years.
87 The value choices here 
are front and center. Though some argue that we should desist from 
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“class warfare” and that it is wrong for people to be “envious” of 
those who are successful, others argue that inequality not only harms 
the economy but also contradicts the American ideal of equal 
opportunity.
88 
When slavery was abolished, decisions needed to be made about 
who would own the plantations upon which the slaves worked.
89 A 
decision could have been made to transfer ownership to the former 
slaves either in individual lots or in a corporate or collective form. 
The slaveowners who rebelled against the United States could have 
forfeited their property rights in the land. None of these things 
happened. The rebels who pledged loyalty to the United States got to 
keep their lands, and over time, less and less was done to help the 
former slaves.
90 They received neither back wages nor land of their 
own.
91 What should have been done? 
Economizing on information costs tells us little or nothing about 
what to do here. Information costs are low whether we give the 
plantation to the former slaveowner or the former slaves. Perhaps 
they are lower if we give the land to the former slaveowner because 
then we have one owner rather than many. As I have noted, we could 
lower information costs about who controls property even further by 
giving all the land there is to one person—as actually occurred when 
William conquered England and was crowned king on Christmas day 
in 1066.
92 Of course, giving one person ownership of all the land 
increases some transaction costs; if everyone in the land wants access 
to it, then the king has a lot of meetings to take, and the costs of 
managing all those requests will be quite burdensome on him and on 
everyone else who is, in the meantime, excluded from the things they 
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need. So perhaps there is an efficient balance between information 
costs and transaction or management costs. The point, however, is 
that costs of managing the system are not the only thing we care 
about. We are interested in the distribution of property not only 
because we care about satisfying our preferences at the lowest 
possible cost but also because we care about how many  people’s 
preferences get satisfied. More than that, we care about whether we 
are living in a democratic or a feudal society, whether we will have 
freedom or servitude, and whether we will have equal status before 
the law or titles of nobility. 
Consider the continuing dilemmas in South Africa, where the 
antiapartheid constitution both granted a fair amount of protection to 
existing property owners and authorized land reform and common 
law development needed to move from an apartheid society to a free 
and democratic one.
93 Continuing choices need to be made that reflect 
not only pragmatic economic and political needs and realities but also 
fundamental value choices. The one thing that cannot be assumed is 
that all “established property rights” must be protected; that would 
be a recipe for servitude. Recall the idea that property makes liberty 
possible. As Professor Jeremy Waldron has explained, everything that 
is done must be done somewhere, and one cannot do anything unless 
one has a place to do it.
94 Virginia Woolf famously argued that women 
could not write novels until they had a room of their own.
95 If the 
system of property law does not make it realistically possible for each 
person to become an owner of the property needed for a full human 
life, then we have deprived individuals of the freedom that was the 
reason for creating property rights in the first place. In a society that 
has chosen to reject apartheid as a way of life, property rights must 
not only be redistributed but also tailored to enable equal liberties to 
emerge.
96 
The question of how much inequality is appropriate cannot be 
answered by quantitative or economic analysis alone; rather, it 
implicates the meaning of the values of liberty and equality. It 
engages choices about the contours of a free and democratic society. 
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Conservatives suggest that property redistribution is anathema 
because property is the basis of liberty; on that view, taking property 
inevitably takes liberty. But liberals argue that if property is necessary 
for the exercise of liberty, then denying property ownership denies 
the ability to exercise liberty; on that view redistribution may be 
required to promote freedom. Determining whether our system 
generates sufficient opportunities to acquire property (or the abilities 
that property enables) implicates normative questions that can only 
be answered by reference to analysis of the fundamental values of 
freedom, equality, and democracy. 
C.  Who Can Own Property in a Democracy? 
The Fourteenth Amendment ensures “equal protection of the 
laws,”
97 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ensures that every citizen 
shall have the same right to purchase and own property as is enjoyed 
by white citizens.
98 The Public Accommodations Law of 1964 ensures 
equal access to certain public accommodations without regard to 
race.
99 The 1968 Fair Housing Act prohibits the creation of racial 
covenants as well as racially discriminatory refusals to sell or rent or 
mortgage property because of race, religion, or national origin.
100 And 
the case of Shelley v. Kraemer
101  interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause to allow owners to create racially restrictive covenants but 
denied them the power to enforce them in court.
102 All these laws and 
decisions have embodied an antiapartheid principle at the heart of 
modern American property law; no one can be denied the 
opportunity to acquire or enjoy property because of the color of their 
skin.
103 We tend to take these laws for granted in 2014, but the 
abolition of racial restrictions on access to property occurred in my 
lifetime. And although the married women’s property acts of the 
nineteenth century ensured that married women could own and 
control their own property,
104 it was not until the 1960s that equitable 
distribution statutes ensured women in separate property states a 
 
 97.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
  98.  Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). 
  99.  Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006). 
  100.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.  
  101.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 102. Id. at 13, 22.  
 103. See generally Singer, Anti-Apartheid Principle, supra note 55. 
 104. SINGER, supra note 33, § 9.2.2, at 392–93. SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:59 PM 
1314  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  63:1287 
share of the marital property accumulated during marriage upon 
divorce.
105 
The question of who is entitled to own property is not limited to 
issues of discrimination. Consider the tenants who are evicted when 
their landlords lose their properties to foreclosure after defaulting on 
subprime mortgages. Should rent-paying tenants have any rights to 
stay in their homes? The law has traditionally said no because tenants 
are not owners and the new owners have the right to end periodic 
tenancies upon giving requisite notice.
106 But recall that homeowners 
were also originally not owners when they borrowed money in 
exchange for a mortgage on their property. Some states—like the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts—retain this old-fashioned system. 
When you grant a mortgage to a bank in Massachusetts, the bank has 
title to your property until you pay off the note.
107 Similarly, states 
that use deeds of trust rather than mortgages grant title to the 
property to the trustee until the debt is paid.
108 Despite the fact that 
the borrower gave the property title to the lender in exchange for the 
loan and the borrower then defaulted on the loan in violation of the 
agreement, the equity courts in England intervened to protect the 
rights of nonowners from strict foreclosure, allowing them to stay on 
land they did not “own,” even though they had defaulted on their 
obligations, as long as they paid off the debt in a reasonable time.
109 
So too do statutes in most states, which give homeowners the right to 
stay in their homes and avoid foreclosure if they can make up the 
payments they have missed in a timely fashion.
110 These protective 
rights exist even though the mortgaged homeowners in states like 
Massachusetts do not have title to their homes and even though they 
have missed payments they solemnly promised to make. 
Why then do not tenants who are paying the rent have the same 
rights to stay in their homes after foreclosure, especially when the 
new owner is a bank that has no interest in moving into the home 
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itself? In the mortgage context, we deem the bank’s interest to be 
only in the repayment of the debt with contractually agreed-upon 
interest, whereas the homeowner’s interest is a personal attachment 
to the home, deserving of solicitude regardless of what the contract 
says. As long as the bank is made whole monetarily, mortgage law 
gives the homeowner the right to stay in her home. Why are 
residential tenants denied this right? Several jurisdictions have in fact 
granted tenants the right to remain in their homes unless the landlord 
can show a legitimate reason to evict them, such as the landlord’s 
interest in moving into the property herself.
111 Massachusetts recently 
passed statutes that allow rent-paying tenants to continue to live in 
their homes even after foreclosure if the property is bought at 
foreclosure by the mortgagee-bank, as often happens.
112 Under these 
laws, only when the property is transferred to a third-party owner is 
the tenant vulnerable to eviction.
113 Most states, however, 
conceptualize tenants as nonowners who have no right to continue 
living in their homes once the lease runs out, no matter how long they 
have been living there.
114 
Should tenants have a right to continue living in their homes 
unless just cause can be shown to evict them? Should tenants be 
treated as the “owners” of their leaseholds with landlords relegated to 
a subordinate status as future interest holders who can kick out 
tenants only if the landlords want to occupy the property as their 
home? Should rent-paying tenants be empowered to stay in their 
homes after foreclosure unless the new owner can demonstrate a 
superior interest? Answering these questions requires us to choose 
the kind of social life we want to have. It requires determining 
whether there is a relevant distinction between defaulting 
homeowners and rent-paying tenants. It requires a normative analysis 
of the relevant interests, values, and rights at stake and the 
justifiability of the expectations of the parties. It requires us to 
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determine the value we place on staying in one’s home. All this 
requires something deeper and more fundamental than an analysis of 
cost minimization. 
D.  How Long Do Property Rights Last in a Democracy? 
In college, I took an introductory economics course with 
Professor Randall Bartlett. In one of the early classes, he asked us if 
we were in favor of economic competition. Having been taught that 
competition was a good thing, we all said yes. He looked at us and 
said, “Really? Would you like it if you never knew, when you came to 
class, whether or not there might be someone else already sitting in 
your seat, ready, willing, and able to do a better job than you?” Well, 
no that would be nerve-wracking, we all thought. That would be like 
going home and finding someone else in your bed, as Doctor Zhivago 
did when he came home to find dozens of people living in his 
mansion.
115 We all would like to know that we have a home to go 
home to; we would all like to know we have a seat in the class—at 
least until the final exams come around. Professor Bartlett did not put 
it in these words, but as a property scholar, I know now that what we 
valued was property. We wanted a stable basis of expectation, even if 
that stability was temporary. We wanted a haven from the storm, time 
to learn, time to take advantage of the opportunity that college was. 
Of course, it is not a foregone conclusion that a property law 
system should give us such peace of mind. I played violin in 
orchestras when I was a teenager, and some of them were competitive 
to get into. Auditions not only determined if you got into the 
orchestra but also what your seat was. And more than that, at any 
time, one of the violinists sitting behind you in the orchestra could 
challenge you to an audition to see if they could take your seat from 
you. You never knew, from day to day, whether someone would 
challenge you, play better than you, and take your seat, demoting you 
to a less prestigious perch. You might even be challenged by someone 
in the junior orchestra—a challenge with the real potential for a 
dramatic fall from grace. One could imagine an even more dramatic 
competitive system that would allow anyone—even an outsider—to 
compete at any moment for your seat in the orchestra. Nor is this a 
far-fetched notion. Few Americans have job tenure; the American 
system of at-will employment means that most people can be fired at 
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any time for any (nondiscriminatory) reason. And recent changes in 
the economy have turned many more of us into independent 
contractors who have even less job security than the typical 
employee. 
Our property law system, on the other hand, does not usually 
work this way. Usually our property cannot be taken away from us 
just because someone else thinks they can use it better or need it 
more. If you want to buy my house, you can approach me with an 
offer, but I am entitled to refuse without giving you a reason. I do not 
have to justify myself to you. In particular, I do not have to prove I 
can use the property better and more efficiently than you or that I 
value it more than you do. And you cannot force me to sell my 
property to you no matter how badly you want it or how valuable the 
use you want to put it to. Perhaps one could argue that giving me the 
power to exclude others from my property and to decide when, if 
ever, to relinquish my rights minimizes the costs of figuring out what 
can done with the property. It certainly seems as if that would be the 
case, at least as compared with allowing judges to make case-by-case 
determinations of who is the best user of the land. But the point I 
want to make is that this choice is not only a choice about cost 
minimization; it is a value choice among forms of social life. Do we 
want to organize things so you have a seat in the class with the right 
to graduate if you follow the rules and do the work successfully, or 
would we rather treat you like a day laborer or an independent 
contractor who has to prove yourself from moment to moment, 
constantly at risk of losing your spot in a class? 
Nor is the possibility of conditional property entirely foreign to 
American law. In fact, multiple legal regimes embrace conditional 
property ownership. Recall that some federal lands sold by the 
United States through the nineteenth-century homestead laws were 
conditioned on the buyer building a home on the land and working 
it.
116 Congress decided that the land was better used by settlers than 
by speculators, and so Congress conditioned ownership on that 
basis.
117 The relative hardship doctrine allows you to force me to sell 
my land to you if you build a structure that encroaches on my 
property when you thought in good faith that that property belonged 
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to you and I failed to do anything to stop you from building.
118 You 
can take my property by adverse possession if you occupy it for a long 
time without my permission.
119 Sometimes the courts will even force 
you to sell me the benefit of a covenant you own if it interferes with 
the best and highest use of my property.
120 The state of Hawaii forced 
landowners on the island of Oahu to sell their property to their 
tenants because the distribution of property was so unequal that it 
deprived almost everyone of the chance of becoming an owner.
121 And 
remember that the fair use exception to copyright law prevents you 
from interfering with my freedom to comment on your intellectual 
property.
122 
In all these cases, lawmakers faced a choice between property 
and competition, between stability and change, between quiet 
enjoyment and new development. How much stability do we want 
and how much competition do we want? How much power should 
owners have to stop others from impinging on the value of their 
property? What obligations do owners have to the community and 
their neighbors? Property law systems must take positions on how 
much stability and how much competition to foster. Indeed, at the 
time of the American Revolution, it might well have been thought to 
be a violation of property rights for someone to open a rival store in a 
small town.
123 It took a decision of the Supreme Court in the Charles 
River Bridge case
124 to cement the idea in American law that there 
was no property right to be free from ordinary competition.
125 It took 
a decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois to force the Pullman 
Company to sell its property in Pullman, Illinois on the grounds that 
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company towns were contrary to the “spirit of our institutions.”
126 
Choosing how many owners is enough and how much stability to 
protect are not only choices about the costs of determining how to use 
property and who gets to decide that. Rather, they are also choices 
about the nature of social and political life—choices that depend on 
normative reasoning about what it means to protect the freedom of 
individuals, to treat each person with equal concern and respect, and 
to live in a free and democratic society. 
E.  What Obligations Do Owners Have in a Democracy? 
To the chagrin of the mayor, for many years there has been a 
gaping hole in downtown Boston.
127 Filene’s Department Store closed, 
and the building was purchased by an owner who razed the 
building.
128 Then the subprime crisis struck, and the new owner either 
could not or would not redevelop the property.
129 This left an ugly, 
empty lot in the midst of the downtown area—an eyesore that 
remained for several years, affecting the entire environment of the 
downtown area.
130 The hole in the ground affected the surrounding 
area by depriving the neighbors and the community as a whole of the 
benefits of the business and housing that could have been profitably 
constructed on the property. The mayor and other city officials did 
whatever they could to convince the owner to develop the property, 
to no avail.
131 The most valuable use of the property to the owner may 
have been to leave it vacant and wait for the market value of the 
property to appreciate or for the economy to recover from the Great 
Recession; development may also have been contingent on banks 
recovering from the subprime debacle so that they would be willing to 
loan the money necessary for the development. Perhaps the city could 
have taken the property by eminent domain and transferred it to an 
owner who would develop it rather than wait for market conditions to 
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improve.
132 Of course, this would raise all the flags stirred up by the 
Kelo v. City of New London
133 decision. Taking the property would be 
unconstitutional in many states despite the externalities of the empty 
lot,
134 whereas in other states the taking would only be lawful if an 
empty lot constitutes a form of “blight.”
135 Does the owner have the 
right to leave the lot empty or not when it could be profitably 
developed? Does the city have the power to take the property by 
eminent domain to transfer it to an owner who will develop it? 
Professor Henry Smith is quite right that as a structural matter, 
we start from the presumption that there is an owner with the right to 
exclude others and the power to use (or not to use) the property.
136 
He is also right that we sometimes address this issue through 
“governance” strategies by equitable rules.
137 Such rules may require 
the property to be developed or transferred, or they may force the 
property to be redistributed from a recalcitrant owner to one who will 
develop the property in a manner consistent with the public interest. 
But answering the question of whether the owner has any obligations 
not to leave an empty lot in the downtown area during a recession is 
not one that can be answered only by reference to the structural logic 
of property, the economics of information costs, or the costs and 
benefits of particularized decisionmaking. 
The problem here is not information costs. If you are not the 
owner and you want something to happen on the empty lot, talk to 
the owner. If you are the owner, you are free to use or not to use the 
property and you do not have to explain yourself to anyone—even 
the mayor. Information costs are low here. The problem implicated is 
a  normative question about whether the owner was legitimately 
 
  132.  Indeed, Mayor Thomas M. Menino threatened to seize the site by eminent domain, 
before ultimately providing tax credits to Millennium Partners, which bought the property in 
April 2013. Thomas Grillo, Menino Defends Filene’s Tax Credits for Millennium Partners, BBJ 
REAL EST. DAILY (Sept. 9, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/real_estate/2013/
09/menino-defends-filenes-tax-credits.html.  
  133.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 134. See id. at 489 (“[M]any States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter 
than the federal baseline.”).  
  135.  For example, in California, cities may only take land deemed “blighted” for economic 
development purposes. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33037 (West 2010).  
 136. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1693–94 (arguing that “[t]here is no interest in exclusion per 
se,” but that “exclusion strategies, including the right to exclude, serve the interest in use,” and 
that “property defines things using an exclusion strategy of ‘keep off’ or ‘don’t touch’ and then 
enriches the system of domains of owner control with interfaces using governance strategies”).  
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exercising his property rights or whether he was unjustifiably 
imposing harms on the community by his inaction. Was this an 
instance of a legitimate exercise of an owner’s rights, or was this an 
instance of an owner imposing negative externalities on everyone else 
in the city, jeopardizing their property rights and their livelihoods? 
The question was not how to structure property rights to reduce the 
complexity of human interaction; the question was whether the owner 
had the right to decide by himself to create a crater in the heart of the 
downtown area and stubbornly keep it there for years, or conversely, 
whether the city had the power to interfere with the owner’s freedom 
to choose what, if anything, to do with his own property. Was this a 
case of an individual freely and rationally exercising his legitimate 
property rights, or was it a case of an individual acting to batter and 
damage the property rights of others? 
Smith correctly explains that property law organizes land in a 
way that assigns ownership of bundled rights to individuals or 
corporations and then creates presumptions that grant those owners 
presumptive control of the property.
138 He is also right that we limit 
the rights of owners in particular classes of cases when the exercise of 
property rights harms the rights of others or undermines the social 
network.
139 But Smith wrongly concludes from this that governance 
strategies represent a gloss on a core exclusion strategy.
140 The 
question of whether an owner has the right to be free from 
expropriation of his property for transfer to others is not just a matter 
of “singl[ing] out” particular cases for “special treatment.”
141 It 
embodies fundamental normative choices about the powers that go 
along with ownership in a free and democratic society. It asks us to 
address the constitutional question of whether property can be taken 
from one owner for transfer to another. 
Libertarians who adopt Professor Robert Nozick’s perspective 
would probably argue that owners should not have to sacrifice their 
property for the good of the community when the community wants 
 
 138. See id. at 1709–13 (discussing control and arguing that “the basic features of property 
are not sticks, but automatic, presumptive features of an exclusionary modular strategy”).  
 139. See id. at 1713–16 (discussing equitable safety valves in the context of nuisance law and 
exclusion strategies).  
 140. See id. at 1710 (“[G]overnance strategies—implemented by nuisance law, covenants, 
and regulations—take exclusion as a platform and modify its features when it is important to do 
so.”).  
 141. See id. at 1710 (“At some cost, specific people in the large and indefinite set of in rem 
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to transfer the property from A to B.
142 If the city wants the property 
badly enough, it should offer the owner enough to induce him to sell; 
if he refuses, then he is not only within his rights but also values the 
property more than others do. Of course, the problem is more 
complicated than this. Even Nozick worried about the case of the sole 
owner, arguing that someone who comes to own the only water hole 
in the desert should have obligations to share the water with everyone 
else.
143 Ownership, with the attendant right to exclude others, confers 
power on the owner—power to deny other people things they need to 
live.
144 Granting the owner veto power over the decision whether to 
keep an empty lot in the middle of Boston’s Downtown Crossing 
arguably violates democratic norms by giving despotic power over the 
community to a single individual. This situation approaches lordship. 
Our property norms coexist with democracy as a form of political 
governance; problems can arise if property rights allow the few to 
impose their will on the many. 
Liberals would similarly debate the appropriate resolution of this 
problem. Liberals worry that majorities are likely to deprive 
powerless working class or poor homeowners of their homes to 
transfer them to large corporations or that majorities may decide to 
gentrify a community and displace and disperse a minority enclave. If 
only blighted property can be taken and redistributed, then the poor 
are vulnerable to having their property taken, but the rich are not. 
How is this compatible with equal protection of the law? On the other 
hand, one could classify the vacant lot as blighted because it impacts 
the local economy and is a visual and environmental blot on the 
center of commerce. Owners have no right to use their property to 
harm the property rights of others. They have no right to impose their 
will on the community. We live, after all, in a free and democratic 
society, and we do not abide lords who impose their will on the rest of 
 
 142. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 160–65, 180 (1974) (“By what 
process could such a transfer among two persons give rise to a legitimate claim of distributive 
justice on a portion of what was transferred, by a third party who had no claim of justice on any 
holding of the others before the transfer?”). 
 143. See id. at 180.  
 144. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 
89–90 (2003) (discussing the right to exclude and the power it confers in cases such as those 
involving valuable commodities); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 
NOTRE  DAME  L.  REV.  1033,  1039  (1996)  (explaining how granting a property right to one 
person confers power over others by “necessarily and inevitably den[ying] the same right to 
others”);  cf.  Waldron,  supra note 94, at  299–301  (“As far as being on private property is 
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us. As with the libertarian debate, liberals need to come to terms with 
the conflicting interests and values at stake here, including the 
property interests of the owner and of the neighbors who have an 
interest in a vibrant downtown area where they can congregate, do 
business, and find pleasure. 
So is the owner here exercising his legitimate property rights, or 
is he imposing harm on the community? Does he have the right to put 
his own interests above those of the community, or does he have an 
obligation either to develop his property or submit to a taking by 
eminent domain for transfer to someone who will develop it? These 
questions require normative choices among conflicting values; they 
also require us to interpret the meaning of those values. Would it 
deprive the owner of equal protection of the law to take his property 
because we think others could use it better, or does the owner’s 
refusal to develop the property constitute an inegalitarian exercise of 
power that deprives other owners of the value of their property? 
Would a taking by eminent domain violate equality norms or 
promote them? Would it deprive the owner of the liberty to use his 
property as he wishes, or would it protect the quiet enjoyment of 
neighboring property owners by abating a nuisance? These questions 
implicate not only common law doctrines but also constitutional 
norms. They represent not just special treatment of particular cases, 
but choices of fundamental structural norms and a decision about our 
way of life. They represent choices about the relation between rights 
and power. 
In a free and democratic society, owners have rights, but they 
also have obligations. Restaurants and shops cannot exclude patrons 
on the basis of their race or religion.
145 Nor can public 
accommodations refuse to make reasonable accommodations to 
make their services available to persons with disabilities.
146 Owners 
are not free to ignore longstanding occupation of their property if 
they want to protect themselves from loss of their property by 
adverse possession.
147 Owners cannot vote to pass zoning laws that 
unduly inhibit the ability of religious institutions to operate in their 
communities.
148 Landlords cannot fail to provide tenants with heat or 
 
 145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2006); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.6.1, at 45–48.  
 146. SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.6.3, at 65–68.  
 147. Id. § 4.1, at 140–43.  
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hot water.
149 Owners are not free to interfere with the quiet enjoyment 
of neighboring owners,
150 nor are they free to saddle buyers with 
covenants that unreasonably impede the alienability of land.
151 
Owners are not free to sell property without reducing the transaction 
to writing and recording the documents in the registry of deeds.
152 Nor 
are they free to build without complying with local building and 
construction codes.
153 The number of obligations the law imposes on 
owners is far too numerous to mention. And determining what 
obligations owners have requires attention to our deepest norms and 
values. 
Property law is designed to spread freedom, opportunity, 
security, and wealth, but it is also designed to prevent owners from 
inflicting harm on others and from acting in a manner that is 
incompatible with norms of propriety. Condominium associations, for 
example, are empowered to pass reasonable rules governing the use 
of units as well as common areas, and condominium owners are 
subject to those rules.
154 But the law places limits on the kinds of rules 
that can be passed. Those that interfere too much with individual 
freedoms will be deemed outside the lawful authority of the 
association. For example, rules that prevent owners from displaying 
religious symbols on their doors may be prohibited because they 
violate fair-housing laws that protect religious minorities from being 
excluded from housing.
155 The issues that can come up in this context 
and others like it are almost limitless. Can condominium associations 
prohibit smoking entirely both in common areas and inside units? 
Can they prevent owners from posting signs indicating support for 
political candidates? Can universities prohibit students from posting 
political signs on their dorm windows? The Confederate flag? The 
Swastika? Can shopping centers exclude patrons wearing “Peace on 
Earth” t-shirts? Obama t-shirts? Defining the scope of property rights 
means defining the rights and obligations of persons in a free and 
democratic society. 
 
 149. Id. § 10.6.3, at 472–76.  
 150. Id. § 3.1, at 98–100.  
 151. Id. § 6.7.2, at 278–83.  
 152. Id. § 11.3.2, at 506–08.  
 153. Id. § 13.6.1, at 652–53. 
 154. Id. § 8.5, at 375–76. 
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III.  PROPERTY, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 
Suppose we want to think about the basic structure of property 
law. Instead of turning to economics, what would happen if we start 
by looking to political and moral theory instead? What would this tell 
us about the basic structure of property law? It would require us, 
before we do anything else, to choose among political regimes, such 
as dictatorship, monarchy, aristocracy, feudalism, communism, 
tribalism, corporatism, and democracy, among others. We would first 
have to acknowledge basic values that the system should reflect. 
Property scholars sometimes forget to do this because we operate 
within a normative and political framework that we take for granted; 
we live in a democracy, and that means we have made a commitment 
to a certain type of polity. At the same time, we have multiple and 
conflicting interpretations of the basic values that a democracy should 
uphold. 
Hard as it may be to articulate what democracy means, we can 
get some traction by looking to the things democracies reject. If we 
look to our own history as colonies of Great Britain and our own 
experience with the institution of slavery, it becomes evident that we 
have rejected monarchy, feudalism, established religion, and slavery 
as forms of social life and as political systems. This also means we 
reject those ways of organizing control over property. Though all this 
may seem obvious, it actually exacts substantial constraining force on 
us in defining the type of property law system that is compatible with 
our way of life. What does it mean for us today that we reject 
monarchy, established religion, feudalism, and slavery? What are the 
basic values of free and democratic societies? Arguably the most 
important values we hold are liberty, equality, and government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people. 
We start before all else from the premise that each human being 
is equal.
156 We reject the idea of unequal status.
157 We have no lords in 
America. Indeed, the Constitution contains a Nobility Clause that 
prohibits Congress from granting any title of nobility.
158 We do not 
need to look to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to find an 
equality principle at the heart of the Constitution. Just as we have no 
 
 156. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 158. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States . . . .”); 
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lords, we have no masters. The Nobility Clause,
159 the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,
160 the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s abolition of slavery,
161 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law
162 all teach a single 
lesson. Each person is entitled to equal concern and respect. Part of 
what that means is that each person is equally entitled to freely 
determine her own destiny. We, each of us, have rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. No one can tell us what path we should 
take, what job we must have, where we must live, or how we must 
spend our days. We have individual liberty to decide how to live our 
lives. We are free to adopt and live by the religious and moral values 
that come to us or that we have chosen. And because we believe that 
each human being is “created equal,” we are not free to deny others 
the liberties we demand for ourselves. 
Of course, as Professor Henry Smith argues, this poses a 
coordination problem.
163 But it also poses both a moral problem and a 
political problem. How can the free actions of each be made 
consistent with the free actions of all? This is the basic problem moral 
and political theorists analyze. Equal freedom can be achieved only if 
freedom of action is limited to ensure that one person’s actions do not 
impair the legitimate rights of others to equal freedom. And if 
Professors Jeremy Waldron and Laura Underkuffler are right that we 
are only free to act if we have somewhere to engage in the action,
164 
then freedom requires property to be distributed in a manner that 
gives each and every person a place where she is entitled to be and 
sufficient resources so that she is able to sustain life and to pursue 
happiness. If we adopt democracy as a political system, we will want 
to give individuals freedom to adopt and live by their own moral 
codes as long as those codes are consistent with the ability of others 
to live by their moral codes. We need both space for moral principles 
and space for political principles that enable people with differing 
religious and moral views to coexist together. We differentiate moral 
reasoning from public or political reasoning to some extent, at least if 
we assume that we are going to live in a society with plural 
 
 159. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 160. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 161. Id. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 162. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 163. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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“comprehensive philosophical moral doctrines” as Professor John 
Rawls called them.
165 We need reasons for laws that could be 
acceptable to persons with very different world views, values, 
religious creeds, and perspectives. 
What this means is that we face more than a coordination 
problem; we face the problem of interpreting the values of liberty, 
equality, and democracy and resolving conflicts that may arise among 
them. Though the values of liberty and equality may appear to be 
“self-evident,” their interpretation is not. I may be free to choose my 
friends on the basis of race, but I am not entitled to choose my 
customers or tenants on that basis; owners of residences may choose 
whom to invite to dinner on any basis they like, including a racist one, 
but owners of restaurants may not engage in similarly discriminatory 
choices in determining whom they allow into their establishments. I 
may be free, with others, to create a homeowners’ association, but our 
collective powers must be limited to ensure that the majority of 
owners do not oppress the minority or interfere unduly with the 
freedom of each owner to control her own unit so that she can have a 
place to live her life in peace. 
In addition to basic values of liberty and equality, we believe in 
democratic, representative government with elected officials 
empowered to pass laws and regulations that enable us to live 
together in peace and that promote the common welfare. That means 
that we want to be governed by representatives chosen by the people 
through elections and not experts chosen by the American Economic 
Association or the American Philosophical Association. It means we 
do not have an established church. This does not mean we do not see 
a place for experts or religion; it means they are not the sole 
determinants of social values or the norms that underlie and justify 
our laws. Experts have expertise in particular subject matter areas, 
but they are not the last word on what the laws should be. Religions 
are the source of many of our deepest values, but we do not hand 
government over to religious institutions. Democracies believe in self-
government, and that means that the people, in some way, adopt our 
own laws, including rules governing the distribution and exercise of 
property rights. We want to be able to use our property as we wish, 
but we also want to be able to collectively choose laws that protect 
our property rights from things our neighbors might do next door. 
 
 165. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT § 5.2, at 14 (Erin Kelly ed., 
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Legitimate zoning laws do not take away our property rights; they 
ensure that our property rights are protected. They may limit the 
freedom of individual owners to do what they wish, but they express 
the freedom of the majority to limit property uses to ensure that we 
can have quiet enjoyment of our own property in a municipal 
environment that is diverse, sensible, and attractive. 
Choosing to live in a free and democratic society that treats each 
person with equal concern and respect has enormous consequences 
for the basic structure of property law. But what those consequences 
are differs depending on one’s normative framework. As I have 
noted, the ideals of equality, liberty, and democracy are not self-
defining. They require interpretation of our most fundamental values. 
A libertarian framework such as that presented by Nozick will 
interpret these basic values far differently than a liberal framework 
that uses the approach of Rawls.
166 At the same time, it is crucial to 
understand that there is considerable and perhaps surprising overlap 
between the libertarian and liberal perspectives—far more so than 
one would think if one focused on the polarized political rhetoric in 
the United States. At the very least, democracies require (1) that 
there be many owners, (2) that opportunities to acquire the property 
needed for a full human life are universally (and readily) available, 
and (3) that the scope of the powers granted to owners must be 
subject to rules that reflect both democratic processes and individual 
rights to liberty and to equal, dignified treatment. 
A couple of examples may help us see the fundamental 
normative questions underlying the basic structure of property law. 
Consider the seemingly minor topic of beach access. The state of 
Hawaii grants every person the right to go to the beach anywhere in 
the state.
167 Most states allow public recreational access to the wet 
sand area up to the high-tide line.
168 Unlike the rest of the country, 
Massachusetts and Maine do not even allow public recreational uses 
 
 166. Compare N OZICK,  supra note 142, at 171–72 (“Whether it is done through 
taxation  .  .  .  or through seizure of profits,  .  .  .  principles of distributive justice involve 
appropriating the actions of other persons. . . . [It] makes them a part-owner of you . . . .”), with 
RAWLS, supra note 165, § 32.6, at 114–15 (“Among the basic rights is the right to hold and to 
have the exclusive use of personal property. One ground of this right is to allow a sufficient 
material basis for personal independence and a sense of self-respect . . . .”). 
 167. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77–78 (Haw. 1968); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 90.  
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of the privately held tidelands.
169 In those states, public access rights 
over the wet sand area up to the high-tide line are limited to 
navigation and fishing purposes.
170 Seaside owners own their beaches 
down to the low-tide line and have the right to exclude all others.
171 In 
contrast, the state of Hawaii grants recreational beach access rights 
not only on the wet sand up to the high-tide line but also on the dry 
sand area up to the vegetation line.
172 Shorefront owners have an 
obligation to allow others to hang out on the dry sand beach in front 
of their own homes; they simply do not own the right to exclude 
others from this area.
173 
This Hawaiian property rule may seem like a detail of the 
property system rather than a core issue affecting the basic structure 
of property—but nothing could be further from the truth. The law of 
beach access in Hawaii has an enormous, incalculable impact on 
social life. Though the law limits the property rights of beachfront 
owners as they are defined elsewhere, it increases the wealth of every 
single person in the state by giving them a right to go to the beach 
anywhere in the state. Everyone, no matter how poor, has a backyard 
on the beach. Individuals and families go the shore in the morning to 
swim or surf before work. Families gather to watch the sun go down 
in the evening. Even if they only have a small apartment inland, they 
have a right to sit outside on the beach wherever they please. The 
beach access rule dramatically shapes the character and quality of 
social life. It is a right that Hawaiians have come to take for granted 
and that most cherish. It affects the range of options people have, 
their daily routine, and the sense of satisfaction of almost everyone. 
Suppose a state court in Massachusetts decided to adopt the 
Hawaiian rule. Would this constitute a taking of property without just 
compensation? Four Justices on the Supreme Court would likely say 
“yes” because this would constitute a taking of an “established right 
of private property,” that is, the right to exclude nonowners from the 
dry sand in front of one’s home.
174 But perhaps not: after all, the 
Supreme Court did hold that a California constitutional right to enter 
 
 169. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 174–76 (Me. 1989); Opinion of the Justices, 
313 N.E.2d 561, 568–71 (Mass. 1974); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 88–89. 
 170. SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 88. 
 171. See id. at 88–89. 
 172. Id. at 89–90. 
 173. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77–78 (Haw. 1968); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 90. 
 174. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
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shopping centers to hand out leaflets did not violate the 
constitutionally protected property rights of the owner.
175 Neither the 
federal public accommodations law nor the Fair Housing Act 
constitutes a taking of property in violation of the Constitution even 
though those statutes require owners to refrain from excluding 
customers or tenants because of their race.
176 Would it be unfair to 
redistribute rights from beachfront owners to the public, or would this 
merely constitute a modernization of a common law rule based on 
changing social values? Should the rule adopted by the state courts in 
Massachusetts in colonial times be immune from change, or should 
the states that adopted one approach be entitled to move to another? 
Would it constitute a taking of a public easement of beach access if 
the Hawaii legislature were to adopt the Massachusetts rule? 
Answering these questions requires us to consider the role of 
beach access in social life and whether we understand legitimate 
interests in that area to be static and immune to legislative change or 
dependent on shifting understandings of the obligations that owners 
owe and the rights that owners have. We must consider the kind of 
social life our property norms reflect and shape and the distribution 
of opportunities they embrace or exclude. We must consider the 
legitimacy of various expectations and the justifiability of the exercise 
of various powers. What do we have a right to expect? What 
underlying framework is consistent with our best understanding of 
the relative rights of beachfront owners and the general public? Is the 
right to exclude others from the beach in front of one’s house one of 
the types of property rights that democracies should no longer 
recognize? Does it deny equal concern and respect to each person to 
deny nonowners the right to go to the beach on terms that make it in 
fact accessible to them? 
Political, moral, and legal theory all help us think about these 
questions because they define the contours of a democratic state. 
Both moral and legal theory insist that we look at the issue from the 
perspective of everyone affected by it. Can we give reasons for our 
choices that could or should be accepted by those who have to live 
with them? Modern political theory suggests that property rights 
 
  175.  PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–84 (1980). 
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should be allocated and defined in a manner that accords with a basic 
framework of society that is consistent with democratic political and 
social values in a society characterized by pluralism in comprehensive 
normative views. The basic values that democracies accept are 
implicated in such decisions. What do liberty and equality mean in 
this context? What opportunities do we think should be open to each 
person? Is beach access one of them? 
Libertarians like Nozick would probably say no; beach access is 
not a necessity, and we are all better off allocating control over land 
to private individuals who act as gatekeepers to their property. 
Beachfront owners cannot enjoy privacy or security if strangers have 
the right to sit in their backyard. Once private rights in beaches are 
established, it would violate the reasons we created the state in the 
first place to allow legislatures to deprive people of their duly 
established property rights. But liberals like Rawls might approach 
the question in another way entirely. What rule might we adopt if we 
did not know whether we would be beachfront owners or whether we 
would have enough money to buy such access? Would we choose to 
allow a minority to monopolize enjoyment of beaches? The 
libertarian way of posing the question is likely to result in favoring 
exclusionary rights, while the liberal “veil of ignorance” reasoning is 
more likely to favor public access. Figuring out which approach is the 
best interpretation of our values of liberty, equality, and democracy is 
necessary to answering the question of what we should do. 
If this example seems too unimportant or esoteric, consider 
subprime mortgages. Should we enact regulations that protect 
borrowers from entering adjustable-rate mortgage agreements when 
they are unlikely to be able to make the payments when the interest 
rate goes up? The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a 
jury might well conclude that it constitutes an unfair practice in 
violation of the state’s consumer protection act to grant an adjustable-
rate mortgage-backed loan to a borrower when it was evident the 
borrower did not have a sufficient income to pay back the loan when 
the interest rate adjusted upwards.
177 As the court stated there, 
To issue a home mortgage loan whose success relies on the hope 
that the fair market value of the home will increase during the 
introductory period is as unfair as issuing a home mortgage loan 
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whose success depends on the hope that the borrower’s income will 
increase during that same period.
178 
Similarly, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 
2010,
179 passed as one part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act,
180 makes a consumer’s ability to repay a 
condition for a creditor’s granting a residential mortgage.
181 Final 
regulations have now been issued that prevent the granting of high-
priced mortgages to those who cannot afford them and provide 
presumptive protection for “qualified mortgages” that meet certain 
affordability criteria.
182 
We could allow such agreements to be made on the libertarian 
grounds that individuals should be free to make whatever agreements 
they like and take whatever risks they please whether or not they 
would agree if they had full information. Or we could ban them 
because we have enough experience to know that the vast majority of 
people who enter such agreements do so because they do not fully 
understand them or because we are sure that almost everyone who 
does so regrets it later. Is it better to have owned and lost than never 
to have owned at all? Banning subprime mortgages could be justified 
on the libertarian grounds that it prevents fraud or on the liberal 
grounds that it establishes minimum standards of fair treatment for 
consumers entering the marketplace, ensuring they get what they 
think they are paying for. Allowing subprime mortgages arguably 
promotes the autonomy of borrowers and lenders alike, making them 
masters of their own fates.
183 Which interpretation is better? 
Answering this question requires normative judgments that 
cannot be addressed by an economic cost-benefit analysis or a laser-
like focus on the information costs of the alternative solutions. 
Rather, we are confronted with a choice among values. Are subprime 
mortgages a shining example of individuals exercising autonomy by 
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taking reasonable risks, or are they perfect examples of the ways 
unscrupulous peddlers can pick our pockets? One might think that 
libertarians would be happy to allow freedom of contract while 
liberals would want consumer protection. But it is not clear that 
libertarians should be so happy with deceptive sales techniques; after 
all, deceptive sales practices shade into fraud, and fraud shades into 
theft. Libertarians favor free choice, but they also favor strong 
protection for property rights. For that reason, they are usually strong 
opponents of fraud. Deceptive conduct promotes, not freedom of 
contract, but deals the parties would not have made had they 
understood what they were actually purchasing. And liberals may 
worry that banning subprime mortgages deprives the poor of the only 
path they have to home ownership. 
Nor does efficiency theory give us a clean answer. If information 
costs are a form of transaction cost, then the question is what 
agreement the parties would (or would not) have made if they had 
perfect information. As a counterfactual question, judgment needs to 
be exercised to answer this question: Do we focus on the regret that 
subprime mortgage borrowers feel when things go sour or their joy at 
the initial deal that allowed them to buy a house? Do we accept the 
reasoning of Professor Alan Schwartz, who argues that any 
limitations on freedom of contract simply prevent people from 
“do[ing] the best they can for themselves, given their 
circumstances”?
184 Or should we allow subprime mortgages on the 
grounds that they are the only path for home ownership for the poor 
or those with poor credit ratings? Or do we adopt the approach of 
economist Joseph Stiglitz, who argues “[t]here was no point of putting 
someone in a home for a few months and then tossing him out after 
having stripped him of his life savings. But that was what the banks 
were doing”?
185 Should we protect people from decisions they are 
very likely to regret and promote housing for poor people by methods 
that do not leave them worse off than before? Whatever choice we 
make, we will be establishing minimum standards for market 
transactions consistent with the injunction to treat others with dignity 
and respect. 
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Figuring out whether to allow or prohibit beach access or 
subprime mortgages depends on an interpretation of the values of 
liberty, dignity, equality, and democracy. We have no magic formula 
that tells us what those concepts mean. But that does not mean that 
our consideration of what they entail is totally arbitrary.
186 Despite the 
contentious political debates between libertarians and liberals and 
between utilitarian, deontological, and virtue theories of moral 
reasoning, there are some values we hold to be “self-evident.”
187 Both 
libertarians and liberals favor equality, liberty, the rule of law, and 
democratic government. That means that despite the heated rhetoric 
surrounding the concept of “regulation,” there is an American 
consensus that we need laws that establish rules of the road and 
minimum standards for property and contract law.
188 Those minimum 
standards not only facilitate and coordinate free choices among 
individuals and lower the costs of transactions and information about 
ownership. They also establish norms of conduct consistent with our 
commitment to treat each person with respect and dignity. 
Because we are a society committed to the ideas of democracy 
and human rights, we do not satisfy all preferences no matter what 
they happen to be. Some preferences are off the table, so to speak. 
We do not carefully consider the costs and benefits of adopting 
slavery as a social or economic system; rather, we outlaw it as 
inconsistent with the norms governing a free and democratic society 
that treats each person with equal concern and respect. Similarly, we 
do not allow strict foreclosure or unfair or deceptive business 
practices, and we do not sit back and do nothing when bankers create 
mortgages that wreck the world economy. 
CONCLUSION 
Property law is not simply about best management practices or 
coordination in the face of scarcity. Democracies elect leaders who 
pass laws that establish minimum standards for social and economic 
relationships compatible with our justified expectations and our 
considered judgments about what it means to treat others with dignity 
and respect. Property law is not just a mechanism of coordination; it is 
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a quasi-constitutional framework for social life. Property is not 
merely the law of things. Property is the law of democracy. 